





Duhemian Lessons for Metaphysicians
	In this paper I discuss lessons that metaphysicians might learn from Duhem.  Given Duhem’s well known antipathy to metaphysics, you will likely think that this is a fairly inauspicious beginning with a predictable ending: i.e., physics is one thing, metaphysics another, and never the twain shall meet.  If you will bear with me, however, I hope to persuade you differently.  On the contrary, I will argue, Duhem was both a common sense and metaphysical realist, his nuanced views about the relationship between physics and metaphysics are poorly understood,  and properly understood contain important lessons for us.  I’ll spend most of the paper rehabilitating Duhem and finish with some lessons for metaphysicians.
1.	Physics
Duhem begins his major philosophical work with the claim that historically there have been two prevalent views concerning the proper goal of physical theory: (a) a physical theory should explain the phenomena by revealing them as the manifestations of an underlying reality; (b) a physical theory should provide an abstract representation organizing the phenomena without causally explaining them.  He rejects (a) and endorses (b).  
	Because of his hostility to metaphysical encroachments into physics and his advocacy of abstract representative theories, Duhem has often been regarded as a forerunner of logical empiricism, inspired perhaps by Humean or Kantian concerns.  But this is simply wrong.  He shows little interest in empiricist or Kantian concerns and displays no worries about observability versus unobservability or nature-as-we-represent-it versus nature-as-it-is.  While praising the Machian economy of thought that abstract theories provide, he explicitly denied “a line of demarcation between the knowable and the unknowable.” (1991: 279-280) and rejected such positivist theses as “anything unknowable to positive sciences is in itself absolutely unknowable” (1996: 39).  More strongly, he insisted that positive science rests on metaphysics and informs metaphysics.  This unusual grounding and informing claim must be understood in the context of a delicate interplay in his thinking between metaphysics, physics, and common sense.
2.	Common Sense
Duhem’s philosophical influence was Aristotle and drew heavily on common sense.  He made a commonsensical distinction between nature and our representation of nature and held our ordinary concepts and beliefs generally provide a serviceable and reliable guide to nature:  
If I declare to you that on such and such a day at such and such an hour I saw a white horse in a certain street, unless you have reasons to consider me a liar or subject to hallucinations, you ought to believe that on that day, at that hour, and in that street there was a white horse. (1991: 158-9)
To get statements about “concrete facts” (‘There was a horse on Rue Jacques yesterday at 3:00 pm’) right, we need only “be attentive and alert enough with [our] senses]” (1991: 145).  Similarly, laws of common sense (‘If there’s thunder, there’s lightning’) are “based on the observation of facts by means natural to man” (1991: 165) and arise by “spontaneous generalization” (1991: 153, 166).  More fundamentally, Duhem has an implicit view of the semantics of ordinary vocabulary and concepts: the system of representation embodied in the everyday concepts expressed by our ordinary language provides us direct unmediated access to nature.  Common sense concepts are grasped instinctively and spontaneously.  Common sense statements are either true or false simpliciter.  Laws of common sense are expressed by general sentences “whose meaning is immediate”.  ‘If there’s lightning, then there’s thunder’ “has for the physicist who knows thoroughly the laws of disruptive electrical discharge the same clarity and certainty as it had for the Roman plebeian who saw in a stroke of lightening the anger of Capitoline Jupiter” (1991: 167).
	Duhem espouses a form of common sense realism.  Our ordinary beliefs about concrete objects and in the laws of common sense rest on an epistemologically sound footing, and our common sense concepts secure their extensions in a semantically transparent and immediate manner.  For Duhem, common sense is the starting point of all serious investigation.  Both metaphysics and physics begin their lives trafficking in common sense concepts and principles – body, substance, force, space, time, motion, energy, warm, and their ilk.  Metaphysics analyses our common sense concepts and judgments, attempts to distil essential definitions from accidental dross, and attempts to construct a system that will explain the phenomena.  Physics begins also with common sense concepts and principles:
 [w]e have the concept of body and the concept of law in a manner distinct enough to be able to make a legitimate use of these concepts in all physical investigations.  (1996: 34-35).  
	These principles and concepts appear to our intellect sufficiently certain and sufficiently distinct in themselves that we should be able, without fear of confusion or error, to put them into play through the experimental method (1996: 34).  
The physicist must associate or coordinate these common sense concepts with precisely “defined” physical concepts in a manner that enables him to construct a mathematically precise and detailed system of laws that will maximally unify the phenomena.  
	But this is the beginning rather than the end of the story.  Though common sense provides the starting point of investigation, we do not rest content with it.  Our common sense beliefs are unsystematic, partial, and explanatorily gappy, and our commonsense concepts are imprecise and analytically uncomplicated.  Metaphysics and physics – in their own specific ways – remedy these deficiencies and fulfill needs that are unfulfilled by common sense.
3.	Metaphysics
For Duhem, metaphysics “seeks to understand the nature of brute matter, considered as the cause of phenomena and as the foundation (raison d’etre) of physical laws” (1996: 33).  “An intellect which had a direct intuitive view of the essence of things … would know substance and its modifications simultaneously” (1996: 31-32) and would not have to infer the causes of phenomena from their behavior.  Its direct access to nature would be systematic, complete, and explanatorily unified.  These passages make it very clear that Duhem is also a metaphysical realist – in the sense that what the facts are, what kinds of objects exist, and what principles govern them do not depend on epistemic agents.  The device of an intellect that could super-intuit the essence of things is introduced to point us to the reality that underlies the phenomena.
But we lack such access to nature.  When fashioning our explanations we must rely on our common sense concepts and ordinary methods.  Because metaphysical concepts are abstractions from everyday concepts applied to a domain that by lies beyond their normal, application, because we must infer the causes from the phenomena, there will be lots of room for slippage.  The realities could be arranged quite differently than we take them to be.  Because the same effects can be produced by different causes and the metaphysical method gives us concepts that are “too general, too lacking in detail, and too paltry”, it will be difficult to have any initial confidence in any specific metaphysical system (1996: 33, 68).   
	Thus, Duhem combines a metaphysically realist conception of the world with a modest conception of our access to it.  Of course, it is fair to ask how we know even this much – how we know that metaphysical realism is true or even coherent?  Duhem’s answer relies on a crucial but generally overlooked distinction he draws between general metaphysical truths and particular metaphysical systems.  In metaphysics, especially in its relations to physics, there is the Good (associated with metaphysical truths) and the Bad (associated with metaphysical systems).
4.	The Good: Metaphysical Truths Ground Physics
	Metaphysical truths are very general propositions that arise in us spontaneously, that survive all dialectical questioning, that we cannot honestly deny, and that we have not been given any convincing reason to question.  That there is a unified reality underlying sensible phenomena is such a metaphysical truth (1991: 9-10): “an ontological order …[of] real relations among things” (1991: 26-27), “hidden realities … arranged in a certain order”, “an ontological order according to which inanimate things are classified” (1991: 299).  This belief in “an order transcending physics” cannot be justified by physics; on the contrary, it provides “the sole justification of physical theory” (1991: 335).  Because we believe in metaphysical realism, we also believe that there is a natural classification of the phenomena: a reflection of an ontological order transcending physics’ methods (1991: 299).  Belief in a natural classification is what justifies the pursuit of comprehensive, empirically adequate theories (1991 19-30, 293-298, 334-335).  
	What is missing in positivists’ understanding of the aim of science is the ideal of natural classification.  Even the most positivist-minded physicists, Duhem claims, will agree that “underneath the observable data … are hidden realities …arranged in a certain order” (1991: 296-297).  Mach, despite his claim that physics is an economic contrivance, espouses “the ideal of a unitary conception of the world” (1991: 327), and Poincaré, despite his claim that physics is based on “convenient conventions”, espouses the view that it uncovers “the real relations of things” (1991: 328).  No matter how reflective or critical we are, we cannot rid ourselves of the conviction that “there exists an absolute and universal truth” that guides our search for unified theories of the world (1991: 333).  This conviction cannot be justified from within physics by experiment or logic, but it is shown in our practices: every time we wager on a theory’s experimental outcome, we show that we believe the theory is (to some extent) a natural classification; one would not bet if he really considered the theory to be merely some artificial contrivance.  It is similarly shown in our attitude to incompatible physical theories that are severally empirically accurate in their own domains.  Why do we find this unacceptable?  Not on experimental grounds, because by hypothesis each theory is verified in its domain.  Not on logical grounds, because logic only obliges us not to mix contradictory theories in the same domain.  Instead, we find incompatible theories unacceptable because we can be sure their combination does not conform to the natural order of the laws. 
This is why positive science rests on metaphysics. Metaphysics plays a very limited, but positive role in grounding physics in the sense that we cannot make sense of our own practice of physics unless we believe in the general metaphysical truth that nature is unified and orderly. Our belief that nature is unified and orderly is a presupposition of all our inductive practices, and our belief that there is a natural classification of the phenomena corresponding to nature’s order is a presupposition of all physical practice.   Such beliefs cannot be demonstrated by reason or experiment.  But they also cannot be shaken by reason or experiment: we simply know that any attempt to shake them is not to be taken seriously; though we can intellectually consider the possibility of their falsity, it cannot rationally move us.  
5.	The Bad: Metaphysical Systems and Duhem’s Negative Master Argument
	A metaphysical system is “a collection of positive judgments … by means of which a philosopher seeks to relate metaphysical truths among themselves in a logical and harmonious order” (1996: 33).  Such a system, could we establish one, would provide a natural classification for physics: “a complete metaphysical explanation of the nature of material things would provide us … with the best of physical theories” (1996: 37).  But, because of the underdetermination of causes by their effects noted above, any metaphysical system has a “doubtful and problematic character” and “cannot be regarded as established” (1996: 34).  Duhem’s hostility to metaphysics is directed toward metaphysical systems – more precisely toward physics driven by metaphysical systems.  The goal of causal explanation, he argues, depends on background substantive metaphysical systems, controversial yet dogmatically assumed a priori.  Metaphysics is bad, not because it is meaningless or transcends experience, but because physics driven by metaphysical systems is counterproductive: it fails to deliver the goods.   
	Duhem’s negative master argument is an induction from the history of physics to the conclusion that proponents of causal explanatory theories allow metaphysical preconceptions to dominate their physical theorizing and end up with theories that fail to satisfy the requirements expected of an explanation.​[1]​  So the causal explanatory goal is unattainable and thus should not be pursued.  Here is a sketch of the argument with few supporting examples.  First, causal explanatory hypotheses wax and wane; at one stage one hypothesis is ascendant, another descendant; at another stage the reverse holds.  There is no evidence of continuity or progress. Second, divergences of opinion are irresoluble.  Each metaphysical school operated with its own metaphysical system, which attempted to explain the phenomena in terms of some underlying hidden primary properties: Aristotelian substance and form, Cartesian matter (as extension) in motion, Newtonian space, time, matter, and force, or Huygens’ atomism.  Members of each school stubbornly stuck to its metaphysically primary qualities and accused opponents of postulating occult causes, as Huygens had accused Newton of being committed to absurd action at a distance.  Duhem finds such disputes irresoluble, since they depend on a priori pre-conceptions that have no traction with common sense or experiment.  As such, they hinder, rather than advance, the development of physics (1991: I.I.4).   Third, the abstract principles of physics are logically independent of the metaphysics and were discovered by reflection on experience.  For example, from the metaphysical principle that God’s plan is immutable Descartes concluded that the total quantity of motion injected into the universe at creation remains constant.  To obtain an equation of dynamics, Descartes had to associate an exact physical meaning with the imprecise ordinary expression ‘quantity of motion’.  He interpreted ‘quantity of motion’ as momentum, a precise algebraically structured concept that conformed to the empirical facts he knew.​[2]​  However, alternative precise quantities would have worked equally well – for example, Leibnizean vis viva, which also conforms to the known facts and the immutability of God’s plan.  Duhem’s point is that Descartes fails to derive a physical conservation principle from his metaphysical system.  His “derivation” smuggles in hypotheses that are logically independent of the metaphysics and motivated by reflection on experience with moving bodies.  Since momentum conservation does not follow from, it is not explained by, the metaphysics (1991: 16-18).  
	An examination of 19th century mechanics leads to the same conclusion.  Synthetic treatments (e.g., of Kelvin and Lodge) build up the mechanism from the sizes, shapes, and masses of its elementary bodies and fundamental forces acting on them, extract the law of motion, and compare the result with experiment.  Faced with counterevidence, they switch to new models that are inconsistent with other models they use.  Such theories cover only “a miniscule fragment of Physics” and the “fragmented representations may not be welded together to form a coherent and logical explication of the inanimate Universe” (1980: 100).  Most physicists, Duhem correctly points out, have concluded that synthetic methods cannot deliver coherent, unified explanations.  Analytic treatments (e.g., Maxwell) assume only that the underlying elements are mechanisms and use the system’s Lagrangian and various conservation, equilibrium, and minimal principles to set up the equations that are compared with experiment.  Since the equations doing the work are consistent with any number of hypotheses about the hidden mechanisms, the treatment can hardly be viewed as a victory for mechanical explanation.  Worse, any detailed story about the mechanisms that appealed to real forces could in principle be reproduced by Hertz’s techniques of eliminating real forces in favor of fictitious forces (the apparent results of geometrical constraints or hidden rotations). 
	On Duhem’s view, physics driven by the goal of causal explanation and underlying metaphysical systems had evolved into a disorganized patchwork of (inconsistent) mini-theories, each dealing with special cases, and extended case by case without adequate unified foundations.  Lacking coherence and unity, these theories could not claim to be explanatory.
	Moreover, this indictment of metaphysics-driven physics was commonplace among philosopher-physicists of the late-19th century.  It had become apparent to them that classical Newtonian mechanics lacked the conceptual and mathematical tools to properly describe a host of new phenomena: “visualizable” material points or atoms subject to position-dependent central forces, so successful at representing celestial phenomena in Newton’s and Laplace’s hands, were ill-suited for representing terrestrial phenomena like electromagnetic and dissipative phenomena.  Such phenomena require more general “energetic” principles than what could be derived from Newtonian laws.  Since the abstract concepts (energy, entropy, absolute temperature) needed to construct these principles could not be “reduced” to the relatively ordinary concepts of classical mechanics, our philosopher-physicists were driven to wonder about the relationship between physical, metaphysical, and commonsensical schemes.  Poincaré referred to this puzzlement as “the present crisis in physics” and advocated a physics of principles not tied to metaphysical systems.  Even the realist Planck distinguished between the old physics which was like a gallery of miniatures, each representing its own set of natural phenomena, but not coalescing into a single picture, since each could be removed without prejudice to the others, and the new physics, which must coalesce into a unified whole.  
6.	The Positive Master Argument
	A similar induction on the history of physics concludes that the evolution of abstract theories has made slow, steady progress toward the goal of natural classification, with later theories preserving earlier ones as special cases.​[3]​  A representative theory constructed for some special cases will be later modified, extended, and generalized to more inclusive domains.  Since abstract theorists commit only provisionally to a set of primary properties and are open to revising and enlarging it as the facts demand, there is no gridlock due to dogmatic allegiance to primary qualities.  Duhem himself opted for energetics or general thermodynamics, a truly general abstract theory whose laws and concepts would apply to (every part of) every real body and from which all successful special theories would fall out as special cases.  The kind of theory he favored was a generalization of Lagrange’s analytical mechanics, which employs a single function (the work function that codes all the information about states) defined on the system and derives equations of motion for the system from a single equilibrium principle.  This approach, he argued, generalized in a well-founded way (the product Aδα is work-energy, but A (the action) can be force, torque, surface tension, pressure, respectively as α (the generalized coordinate) is length, angle, surface, or volume) and could be extended to thermodynamic, chemical, electrical, magnetic, and frictional phenomena (1980).  A system’s generalized coordinates then fix its mechanical, physical, and chemical state (its phase, temperature, electric charge, magnetization, and chemical composition), and the generalized “displacements” fix any change of state.  Only such a program, Duhem thought, would lead to a theory that could claim to aspire to being a comprehensive and well-founded natural classification. 
	The upshot is this.  Because metaphysical consensus is unlikely, metaphysical methods are too gross to resolve impasses, and metaphysics-driven physics is self-defeating, the dependence of physics on metaphysics is hindering progress.  The target here is metaphysical systems – their influence in the construction of physical theories is bad, because they set a priori bounds on the physicist’s freedom.  The positive master argument is supposed to show that physics can and does make progress toward the goal of natural classification.
7.	Physics Informs Metaphysics  
	Those who rely on metaphysics or common sense to construct their physics, Duhem argues, put the cart before the horse. Metaphysical systems are too insecure, and the coarse, intuitive concepts of common sense are neither exact nor detailed enough.  The history of science, he argues, teaches us that physics should inform both common sense and metaphysics, and not vice versa.  Common sense can be improved by theoretical science.
	The fund of common sense is not a treasure buried in the soil to which no coin can ever come to be added; 	it is the capital of an enormous and prodigiously active association formed by the union of human minds.  	From century to century this capital is transformed and increased.  Theoretical science contributes its very 	great share to these transformations and to this increase of wealth: this science …penetrates to the bottom 	of common sense knowledge; it awakens its attention to phenomena hitherto neglected; it teaches us to 	analyze notions which had remained confused.  (1991: 261)
How theoretical science improves common sense becomes evident in Duhem’s critique of Euler’s claim that Newton’s law of inertia follows from the self-evident proposition of common sense that all bodies conserve their motion unless operated upon by a force.  Duhem objects that the law contradicted by common sense; our common sense experience with horses and coaches tells us that bodies don’t move without an applied force, bodies subjected to constant force move with constant speed, and speed of a body increases as applied force increases.  Common sense teaches Aristotelian, not Newtonian, dynamical principles, and it took the work of centuries for dynamics to overcome “the false evidence of common sense” and establish Euler’s “self-evident” propositions.  Instead of reaping a genuine dividend, Euler has simply “withdrawn from the fund of common sense knowledge the money that theoretical science had itself deposited in the treasury, in order to return it to theoretical science” (1991: 261).  
	Without a proper physical classification of the phenomena, Duhem also argues, we stand very little chance of providing a metaphysical explanation of their causes and nature.  We cannot hope to explain what we inadequately grasp initially, but as physics provides us with a better grasp of the phenomena in terms of their properties and relationships, we can cautiously hope to get some metaphysical insights into their deeper natures and causes (1991: 293-311).  There should be “a very exact correspondence between [the limiting form of] a natural classification … and the order in which a finished cosmology would arrange the realities of the world of matter” (1991: 301).  Of course, we lack knowledge of both the limiting form of physics and of a finished metaphysics, but in medias res we can move from our best bet about physics, based on our knowledge of its current state and of its history, to metaphysics.  This kind of reasoning must be run with “extreme precautions”, since it is reasoning by analogy.  Nevertheless, “the groups [physics] establishes permit hints as to the real affinities of things” (1996:30), and in the ongoing development of metaphysics, philosophers cannot ignore the deliverances of physics or the funds it deposits in the treasury of common sense: “it is very plain that a cosmological system cannot be reasonably constituted without any knowledge of physics” (1991: 299).  
8.	Lessons for Metaphysicians
	In many ways Duhem’s general approach and advice is laudable and sensible.  On the one hand, we have good reason to think that grand metaphysical schemes are both too unreliable and too sketchy to provide any useful guidance to the development of physics.  On the other hand, we have also have good reason to think that a deep understanding of physics and its history, if modestly and cautiously applied, is helpful, if not necessary, for tackling some of our oldest metaphysical conundra.  
Nevertheless, the history of post-positivist metaphysics and philosophy of science has largely ignored these lessons.  The scientific realism that developed in reaction to logical positivism required that a proper account of scientific practice and development must assign fundamental roles to causation, natural kinds and properties, and the real world.  Scientific theories are “causal-explanatory” theories that reveal the reality underlying the experimental phenomena because their evolution was guided by that reality, and the history of science is seen as a “continuist” evolution of theories that track reality with increasing accuracy.  Partly as a result of this trend and partly as a result of Kripke’s work, metaphysics was reintroduced as a respectable discipline.  Putting aside the worry that scientific realism postulated an implausibly strong metaphysics of science, it looked, for a while, like science was getting the respect it deserved.  But old habits quickly returned.  Neo-Kantians, pragmatists, and empiricists all deployed new variations of old tricks to challenge realism.  Since the 1990s structuralist forms of the debate have emerged.  Few philosophers bother to look for guidance to the 19th century debates among philosopher-physics, where many of these disputes played out, under assumptions that were closer to the heart of physics than philosophical assumptions about observability and mind-independence.  Arguably, for example, one of the best examples of empirically equivalent theories is Hertzian mechanics versus generalized mechanics, which presented a real worry for theory selection in the late 19th century, but was eventually resolved by physics – neither theory is correct.  Moreover, philosophers who do look there often wrongly attribute our philosophical assumptions to the disputants.  Structuralists, for example, appeal to the authority of Poincaré or Duhem but don’t seem to recognize that their structuralist-sounding edicts were less general theses about what science can tell us about the world than they were merely provisional, qualified responses to the particularities of late 19th-century physics.  
	Much of contemporary metaphysics in the past two decades has returned even more strongly to old, and I would say, bad habits, where a priori conceptual analysis and intuition provide the methodological tools and science is either caricatured or ignored entirely.  Much of the metaphysics of science literature is devoted to defending a hierarchy of structured levels for organizing individuals, properties, powers, and mechanisms so that there can be intra-level causal processes and inter-level non-causal relations (of composition, realization, determination, and supervenience) between entities.  The motivation for this is to ensure that mental processes can be multiply realized by physical processes and cause each other independently of any specific underlying causal process so that my thought that I am hungry can cause my action of seeking food in the same way that yours can, even though different physical processes can be going on inside each of us.  This is supposed to safeguard psychology as a science autonomous from physics yet allow that “everything is physical”.  It is also supposed to be how science works as a reflection of the natural order.  This seems to me a wrong solution looking for a problem.  It is wrong because the hierarchical apparatus is a philosophical interpretation of what scientists do and a projection of that interpretation onto the world, not a deliverance of science or metaphysics. This is not, for example, how fluid mechanics hooks up with fundamental physics, where we find laws, constitutive conditions, regularity conditions, boundary conditions, etc., but no sign of causal powers or determining, realizing, or supervening relations.  It is a non-problem because while fluids, no doubt, behave as they do because of their quantum mechanical properties and while we have little idea, not even a schematic one, of how to hook up the properties of fluids with those fundamental properties, we neither doubt that there’s a connection nor give up fluid mechanics.  Why should it be any different with minds and psychology?
	Similarly, much of the literature on mereology and material composition simply ignores science.  Though it is relatively straightforward to formally characterize parts and wholes and to define atoms, and gunk, it is more difficult to answer questions like: is everything composed of atoms or of atomless gunk?  Where do we find the appropriate constraints on an acceptable answer?  The tendency in the literature is to look to our ordinary concepts.  But this is unlikely to help for the reasons suggested by Duhem: there is no reason to think that our ordinary concepts are sufficiently precise to provide the kinds of checks that would be needed, and indeed plenty of reason to think they are not.  For example, one argument in favor of atomless gunk supposes that atoms would be like impenetrable little billiard balls and then runs a reductio.  How could two of them experience contact action, which should be possible?  Only by overlapping at their contact point, but then they are not impenetrable, or by being in contact even they do not overlap at a contact point, but then how can they be in contact?  As Smith argues in (2007), this conundrum arises from the implausible assumption that our ordinary concepts of contact and impenetrability are precise enough to generate the reductio.  More precisely, it assumes implausibly that our ordinary concept of contact is to be treated as topological connectedness and topological models contain enough structure to model bodies, massive things that move when forces are applied.  But there are alternative and better ways of precisifying our ordinary concepts, among them the tried and tested way of modern continuum mechanics that has a better right to count as a model of ordinary bodies and that permits impenetrable bodies to be in contact.  
On that note, I’ll end by simply repeating Duhem’s call for science to inform metaphysics and not vice versa.
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^1	  Descartes, Huyghens, Boscovich, Laplace, Poisson as well as 19th century mechanists and atomic theorists.  The argument is ubiquitous in Duhem’s writings and draws on the histories of magnetism, optics, mechanics, of heat, and physical chemistry.
^2	  More accurately, as Leibniz and his followers were to point out, Descartes’ principle conserved the quantity, mass times speed, a quantity that empirical data showed not to be conserved in elastic collisions.
^3	  Newton, Fresnel, Ampère, Fourier, and Rankine are heroes as well as 19th century energetics and thermodynamics.  
